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This study constructs a new data set on unemployment rates in Latin 
America and the Caribbean and then explores the determinants of 
unemployment. We compare different countries, finding that 
unemployment is influenced by the size of the rural population and 
that the effects of government regulations are generally weak. We 
also examine large, persistent increases in unemployment over time, 
finding that they are caused by contractions in aggregate demand. 
These demand contractions result from either disinflationary 
monetary policy or the defense of an exchange-rate peg in the face of 
capital flight. Our evidence supports hysteresis theories in which 
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 What determines the long-run level of unemployment, or natural rate? This 
paper examines this question for countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.      
We see three related reasons for studying unemployment in Latin America.   
First, there is a lot of variation to be explained.  For example, a quick glance at 
data for the 2000s suggests that the natural rate is around 5% in Mexico, 10% in 
Chile, and 15% in Argentina.  In many countries, unemployment has changed 
greatly over time. In Argentina, unemployment was about 5% in the 1980s.   
 Second, Latin American unemployment is understudied.  Few economists have 
made systematic efforts to explain the variation that we’ve noted.  Heckman 
and Pagés (2004) seek to explain unemployment with differences across 
countries in government regulations, but they are mostly unsuccessful.  The 
scarcity of research on Latin American unemployment contrasts with the huge 
literatures on unemployment in Europe and the United States. 
T h i r d ,  r e s e a r c h  o n  L a t i n  A m e r i c a  p r o m i s e s  t o  s h e d  l i g h t  o n  u n e m p l o y m e n t  
more generally.  The U.S. and European data have been mined extensively, and 
economists still disagree about the determinants of long-run unemployment. 
Some argue that labor-market institutions are the key factor (e.g. Nickell, 1997), 
some emphasize the interaction of institutions with a variety of macroeconomic 
shocks, (e.g. Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000), and some argue that monetary 
policy influences long-run unemployment through hysteresis mechanisms (e.g. 
Ball, 2009).  Latin America provides a fresh set of experiences that will help us 
test these ideas. 
 A major reason that Latin American unemployment is understudied is lack of 
data.  Unemployment statistics are fragmentary, and there are big differences in 
how unemployment is measured across countries and over time.  Therefore, a 
major part of our project involves data gathering. We examine two data sets, 
one constructed by the Interamerican Development Bank and one that we have 2 
 
put together ourselves.  The two data sets are complementary: the first is more 
consistent across countries, while the second provides longer time series within 
countries.  Section 2 of this paper describes these data. 
Section 3 uses the IADB data to examine differences in unemployment across 
countries. Our strongest result is that unemployment depends negatively on the 
proportion of the population in rural areas. We find mixed evidence on whether 
payroll taxes affect unemployment, and no effect of legal restrictions on hiring 
and firing. 
Section 4 uses the new data we have constructed to analyze changes in 
unemployment over time.  Our most important results concern large increases 
in long-run unemployment, which we measure by smoothing annual 
unemployment with the Hodrick-Prescott filter.  We identify six episodes since 
the 1970s in which a country’s long-run unemployment rate rose by more than 
four percentage points.  In every case, the cause was a deep recession produced 
by a fall in aggregate demand.  In some episodes, the underlying shock was a 
tightening of monetary policy aimed at reducing inflation. In other episodes, 
capital flight caused a severe recession because a country maintained a rigid 
exchange-rate peg. 
In conventional macroeconomics, demand-driven recessions affect 
unemployment in the short run but not in the long run. Thus, our interpretation 
of increases in unemployment is at odds with conventional models. Our 
evidence supports theories of hysteresis, in which short-run changes in 
unemployment influence the evolution of the natural rate.   
Section V concludes the paper, and an Appendix provides details about our 




2. Unemployment Data 
We will examine two sets of unemployment data, one constructed by the 
Interamerican Development Bank and one that we have put together ourselves.  
The two data sets are complementary: the first is more consistent across 
countries, while the second provides longer time series within countries.  The 
rest of this section describes these data. 
A. The IADB Data 
The IADB provides annual unemployment rates for 19 countries. The data start 
in 1990 but are highly incomplete: for many countries, there are only a few 
observations.  There is no rhyme or reason to which years are available (e.g., for 
Ecuador, we have data for 1994, 1995, 1998, 2006, and 2007; for Venezuela we 
have data for 1991 through 2004).  For most countries, the data include separate 
unemployment rates for urban and rural areas as well as nationwide 
unemployment. 
The virtue of this data set is that the IADB has tried to adjust for differences 
across countries in definitions of unemployment.  The data are sufficiently 
standardized that we can plausibly use them for cross-country comparisons of 
unemployment rates. In the IADB data, an individual is asked about a 
“reference week” shortly before the survey and is considered unemployed if he 
(i) Did not work or have a job during the reference week and (ii) Searched 
actively during the reference week. Active search involves contact with 
potential employers, interviewing for jobs, filling out applications or contacting 
employment agencies.  
A few differences in unemployment definitions remain in the IADB data. As 
described in the Appendix, we have made simple adjustments to account for 
these differences. Table A1 reports our final version of the IADB data. 
 4 
 
B.  A New Data Set 
Our study also examines a data set for 19 countries that covers far more years 
than the IADB data.  For a number of countries we have annual data on 
unemployment back to the 1970s, with few missing observations. We have 
pieced together these data from country-specific sources – central banks, labor 
ministries and national statistical agencies – and international agencies such as 
the ILO (International Labor Organization).    
It is challenging to find consistent data.  There is great variation in how 
unemployment is measured, both across countries and over time in a given 
country.  For example, some unemployment series cover a few cities and others 
cover the whole country; the series cover varying age groups (e.g. 12+ or 14+); 
and the definition of unemployment varies widely. Sometimes virtually 
everyone without a job is counted as unemployed, sometimes you must have 
searched for work within a certain period, and so on. Often, data sources have 
footnotes saying that changes in methodology occurred in certain years but not 
saying what the changes were. 
It appears hopeless to derive long unemployment series that are comparable 
across countries. As we’ve noted, the IADB’s efforts to construct comparable 
data were successful only for scattered years since 1990. However, we have 
constructed longer series that we believe are reasonably consistent within each 
country. We can use these data to study the evolution of unemployment over 
time. 
To derive our data, we have gone country by country to figure out how 
unemployment was measured in different periods.  We have made judgments 
about which changes in methodology are small enough to ignore, and how to 
adjust for larger changes.  In some cases we can splice different unemployment 
series together using periods in which they overlap.  When in doubt, we have 
sought advice from people at the agencies that produce unemployment data. 5 
 
The Appendix describes how we constructed unemployment data for each 
country. To illustrate our strategy, we describe here how we dealt with breaks 
in the data for two countries. In one case, we adjusted the data to produce a 
consistent time series; in the other, we could not find an adjustment that we 
trusted, so we discarded data. 
Mexico. Our data come from a government agency, the National Institute of 
Statistics and Geography.  They cover three cities--Mexico City, Guadalajara 
and Monterrey--and begin in 1973. For years before 1985, the National Institute 
reports an aggregate unemployment rate for the three cities; starting in 1985, 
they report separate rates for each city. For the later period, we measure 
unemployment with a weighted average of the three city rates, where the 
weights are based on population in 1990. 
In 1984, the government also changed its definitions of employment and 
unemployment. Two groups of people were moved from the category of 
unemployed to employed: people waiting to start a job within 30 days, and 
laid-off workers who expect to return to their jobs within 30 days. Also, unpaid 
family workers who work less than 15 hours a week, who were previously 
counted as unemployed, were dropped from the labor force. These changes 
reduce the unemployment rate. Fortunately, unemployment for the three cities 
was measured with both the old and new definitions in 1984. The 
unemployment rate was 6.0% by the old definition and 5.7% by the new 
definition. Therefore, to make pre-1985 unemployment rates comparable with 
later data, we multiply them by the ratio 5.7/6.0.  
  Trinidad and Tobago: We use a consistent unemployment series from the 
International Labor Organization that begins in 1987. Data are available before 
1987, but with a different definition of unemployment: labor force entrants who 
are seeking their first job are counted as unemployed starting in 1987 but not 
before that. We have not found overlapping data with the two methodologies. 
Data from other countries suggests that first-time job seekers are a large share 
of the unemployed—sometimes more than a third. We don’t know how much 6 
 
the unemployment rates for Trinidad and Tobago are affected by the exclusion 
of first-time job seekers, so we discard the pre-1987 data.  
We believe that the unemployment series we have constructed will be useful for 
future research. These data, reported in Table A2, cover 19 countries with 571 
country-year observations. The median country has 33 years of continuous 
data. The longest series is Chile’s, which runs from 1957 through 2007. We end 
the sample in 2007 for all countries; in this paper, we wish to sidestep the 
question of how the financial crisis of 2008-2009 affected unemployment.  
 
3. Cross Country Differences in Unemployment 
Here we examine differences in unemployment across countries, seeking to 
explain them with variables that capture the level of economic development 
and institutions in the labor market. We use the IADB data on unemployment, 
which are comparable across countries. 
Measuring Long-Run Unemployment 
We are interested in a country’s long-run level of unemployment, or natural 
rate. One could estimate this variable by averaging unemployment rates for 
years in which data are available. This approach may be misleading, however, 
because the years in the IADB data set vary greatly from country to country. 
Latin American unemployment is generally higher in some years than in others, 
implying that the timing of data influences a country’s average unemployment. 
This average is higher if the country’s data happen to come from high-
unemployment years. 
In estimating long-run unemployment, we control for the timing of data. We 
run an unbalanced panel regression of unemployment on dummy variables for 
countries and years, using all country-year pairs in our sample. Our measure of 
a country’s long-run unemployment is the coefficient on the country’s dummy 7 
 
plus the average of all time effects. We can interpret this variable as an estimate 
of average unemployment over the period spanned by the entire IADB data set 
(1990-2007).  
Table 1 shows our estimates of long run unemployment for each of the 19 
countries in the IADB data. For comparison, it also shows simple averages of 
the unemployment rates reported for each country, which do not control for 
time effects. The long-run unemployment rates that we create differ from 
simple averages by moderate amounts (sometimes one or two percentage 
points). 
The data reveal great heterogeneity in Latin American unemployment rates. 
Long-run unemployment ranges from 1.2% in Guatemala to 12.9% in 
Argentina. The mean across countries is 6.0% and the standard deviation is 
3.0%. This variation presents an opportunity for us to take a fresh look at the 
debate about unemployment. What could explain such differences across 
countries?  
Candidate Explanations 
  We examine two sets of variables that might influence unemployment: 
measures of economic development and measures of labor-market distortions 
caused by government policy. Labor market policies are a focus of research on 
unemployment in advanced economies (e.g. Siebert, 1997; Nickell, 1997). 
Development levels are natural to examine in our context because they vary 
greatly across LAC countries; in 2000, for example, real GDP per capita ranged 
from US$ 2126 in Nicaragua to US$ 12095 in Mexico. 
Here we briefly describe the variables that we examine. The Appendix gives 
further details on how the variables are constructed. 
Development Variables: We examine four variables in this category: 
  Real GDP per capita 8 
 
  Educational attainment of the population, as measured by Barro and Lee 
(2001) 
  Agricultural output as a percentage of GDP 
  Rural population as a percentage of total population 
Labor-Market Variables: Research on advanced-economy unemployment 
emphasizes distortions caused by government policies. Data on labor-market 
policies are relatively scarce in Latin America, but we have found two sources 
that provide measures of distortions. One is Heckman and Pagés’s (2004) 
extensive study of Latin American labor markets; the other is Doing Business, a 
periodic publication of the World Bank.  
We examine four variables that measure constraints on employment flexibility, 
two from the Heckman-Pagés data (HP) and two from Doing Business (DB). 
Brief definitions of these variables follow (see Appendix for details): 
  Advance notice: the number of months’ notice that an employee must be 
given before being fired (HP) 
  Indemnities for dismissal: The cost to employers of mandatory payments 
to workers who are fired (HP) 
  Firing costs (DB): A measure of the total cost of advance notice 
requirements and payments for dismissal 
  Rigidity of employment (DB): A broad index of restrictions on employers 
in hiring, firing, and adjusting workers’ hours 
We also examine two variables that measure taxes paid by employers, one 
from each data set: 
  Social security contributions (HP): the cost of required employer 
contributions to social security programs including retirement funds, 
disability insurance, and unemployment insurance 9 
 
  Labor taxes (DB): the cost of “all charges levied on labor,” including social 
security contributions, for a mid-size firm. 
 Cross-Country Regressions 
Here we examine the explanatory power of our candidate variables for cross-
country differences in unemployment. Overall we have ten candidate variables. 
With only 19 countries in the sample, we restrict attention to specifications with 
a small number of variables. We start with simple regressions of long-run 
unemployment on a single variable, then use these results to motivate multiple 
regressions. We first consider development variables, then labor-market 
variables, then combinations of the two. 
Table 2 examines the four development variables. The first four columns show 
simple regressions of unemployment on each variable. Two have significant 
coefficients: GDP per capita, with a positive coefficient, and rural population, 
with a negative coefficient. Each of these results means that greater economic 
development--higher GDP or lower rural population—implies higher 
unemployment. 
GDP per capita and rural population have a correlation of –0.80 (higher-income 
countries are less rural). To separate the effects of these variables, we regress 
unemployment on both of them, as shown in the last column of Table 2. In this 
specification, only rural population remains significant, suggesting that it is the 
primary development variable that influences unemployment. The first panel of 
Figure 1 shows a scatterplot of unemployment against rural population.     
Table 3 presents simple regressions of long run unemployment on labor market 
variables. Of the six variables we consider, only one, social security 
contributions from the Heckman-Pagés data, is significant. Higher social 
security contributions (SSC) imply higher unemployment. The second panel of 
Figure 1 shows this relationship in a scatterplot.  10 
 
Table 4 presents our final specification. Motivated by the previous tables, we 
regress unemployment on rural population and SSC. Here, rural population is 
significant and the significance of SSC is borderline (p=0.09). The adjusted R-
squared is 0.60. We have checked that any third variable is insignificant when 
we control for rural population and SSC.  
Discussion 
Both the effect of rural population on unemployment and the effect of SSC have 
straightforward interpretations. Development economists have long recognized 
that unemployment is generally lower in rural areas than in urban areas (e.g. 
Squire, 1981). This fact is confirmed by the IADB data, which, for 17 countries, 
include urban and rural unemployment rates as well as total unemployment. 
When we compute long run unemployment rates for each country (again 
removing time effects), the averages of these rates across countries are 6.3% for 
urban unemployment and 3.2% for rural unemployment. Thus it is natural that 
total unemployment is lower in more rural countries.1    
A number of factors may contribute to the difference between urban and rural 
unemployment. One is the Harris-Todaro (1970) effect: workers crowd into 
urban areas to seek scarce but high-paying jobs. Other possible factors include 
greater self-employment and larger informal sectors in rural areas; less 
unionization and weaker enforcement of minimum wages (Rosenzweig, 1987; 
Bernal, 2009); and more efficient matching of workers and jobs in small 
communities.  
The effects of social security contributions are stressed by some students of 
European unemployment (e.g. Siebert, 1997). They argue that the costs to 
employers create a “tax wedge” that reduces labor demand and increases 
                                                            
1 Under this interpretation, a country’s rural population affects the weights on rural and urban 
unemployment in aggregate unemployment. In theory, rural population could also affect the 
underlying rural and urban unemployment rates. However, when we regress either urban 
unemployment or rural unemployment on rural population and SSC, rural population is 
insignificant. 11 
 
unemployment. Our regressions provide some evidence for this effect in Latin 
America. 
There is reason, however, to question the robustness of this result. Recall that 
one of our labor-market variables is “labor tax” from the Doing Business data 
set. This variable and SSC appear to be similar measures of tax wedges, 
although, as described in the Appendix, there are differences in details (for 
example, the Doing Business variable includes only taxes with statutory 
incidence on employers, while SSC includes contributions by workers). One 
might expect the two variables to be strongly correlated, but in fact the 
correlation across countries is only 0.30. As shown in Table 3, the effect of labor 
tax on unemployment is insignificant. Future work should further explore these 
results and seek to determine the best measure of tax wedges. 
Comparison to Heckman and Pagés 
This study builds on Heckman and Pagés (2004), who construct some of the 
labor-market variables that we examine. Heckman and Pagés find that labor-
market variables have significant effects on unemployment in advanced 
economies (mainly in Europe). However, when they restrict their sample to 
Latin American countries, none of the variables is significant—including social 
security contributions, which is significant in our regressions (see Heckman-
Pagés Table 8B).  
There appears to be a simple explanation for this difference in results. Heckman 
and Pagés estimate the effects of labor-market variables in panel data, with 
country fixed effects. Thus, unlike us, they do not exploit the cross-country 
variation in their data; instead, their results are based on variation over time. In 
most countries, labor-market variables such as SSC do not change greatly over 




4. Time Series Evidence  
We now turn from cross country comparisons to examine changes in 
unemployment over time.  Following the strategy in Ball (2009), we first 
identify episodes of large rises and falls in trend unemployment.  Then we 
examine each episode to see why unemployment changed.  
Identifying Large Changes in the Natural Rate 
Here we use the annual time series for unemployment that we have constructed 
for each country in our sample (Table A2). These series may not be comparable 
across countries, but we have sought to make them consistent over time in a 
given country. Therefore, we can use these data to measure changes in a 
country’s unemployment rate. 
We are interested in changes in a country’s long-run or natural rate of 
unemployment, not in cyclical fluctuations. We estimate the natural rate by 
smoothing the unemployment series with the Hodrick-Prescott filter, with a 
smoothing parameter of 100.  In the analysis that follows, U is the actual 
unemployment rate and U* is our estimate of the natural rate.2  
Using our series for U*, we identify episodes of “large” changes in the natural 
rate. After some experimentation, we define such an episode as a period in 
which U* rises or falls monotonically and the total change from start to finish is 
greater than four percentage points in absolute value. An episode starts at 
either a local minimum of a country’s U* series, a local maximum, or the first 
year for which we have data for the country; the episode ends at the next local 
minimum or maximum or the last year of data.  
We believe that, by focusing on large changes in U*, we pick out episodes of 
true, substantial changes in long-run unemployment. Smaller changes in U* 
                                                            
2 Many researchers treat the natural rate of unemployment as a time-varying parameter in a 
Phillips curve and estimate its path using data on inflation as well as unemployment (e.g. 
Staiger et al., 1997; Ball and Mankiw, 2002). This approach is not appropriate for Latin 
American countries, because episodes of very high inflation make the assumption of a stable 
Phillips curve untenable. 13 
 
might reflect measurement error or cyclical movements in unemployment that 
our simple detrending has not removed. 
For the 19 countries in our sample, our four-percentage-point criterion yields a 
total of 11 episodes of large unemployment changes—six increases and five 
decreases. For each episode, Table 5 lists the country, the time period, and the 
levels of U* at the start and end. Figure 2 shows the series for U and U* for all 
countries in which an episode occurred, with episodes shaded in light gray. The 
Figure also shows annual data on output growth, inflation, and the real 
exchange rate against the U.S. dollar (increases in the variable are appreciations 
of the local currency); we use these data to help interpret the episodes.3 
A number of episodes include a sub-period when U* changed rapidly, 
accounting for most of the total change. In the rest of the episode, U* changed in 
the same direction, but not by much. In seeking explanations for the change in 
U*, we focus on what happened around the “core” period of rapid change. 
Specifically, we define the core as the period when U* changed by at least 0.5 
percentage points each year. In Figure 2, the core of each episode is shaded in 
dark gray. 
Chile, for example, experienced an episode of rising U* that lasted 18 years, 
from 1965 to 1983. U* rose a total of 10.1 percentage points (from 5.7% to 15.8%). 
The core of Chile’s episode covers ten years, from 1971 to 1980, which account 
for 8.2 percentage points of the rise in U*. 
Across the eleven cases in Table 5, the length of an episode ranges from 7 to 26 
years. The core period ranges from 3 to 11 years, except for 20 years in Trinidad 
and Tobago. Each episode has one core, except for Jamaica’s, which has two.    
In the rest of this section, we seek to explain the large changes in U* that we 
have identified. For comparison, we also examine episodes in which actual 




Explaining Increases in U* 
What causes increases in long run unemployment? When we examine the six 
cases in Table 5 and Figure 2, we quickly see that they have something in 
common: in each case, the core of the episode occurred around the time of a 
severe contraction in aggregate demand. The demand contraction caused a 
large increase in unemployment, U. The fact that U* also rose substantially 
suggests some hysteresis mechanism through which a demand-driven increase 
in unemployment affects the natural rate. This story is similar to Ball’s (2009) 
interpretation of natural-rate increases in European countries in the 1980s and 
90s. 
What caused the demand contractions behind the increases in unemployment? 
There are two different answers, each of which is the primary explanation for 
three of our six episodes. In Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela, the cause was a 
severe tightening of monetary policy motivated by the central bank’s desire to 
reduce inflation. In Argentina, Paraguay, and Panama, the cause was a 
combination of capital flight and a nonaccommodative policy response: the 
exchange rate was not allowed to fall, or could not fall because of dollarization.  
To flesh out these stories, we briefly examine each of the six episodes, focusing 
on the core period of rapidly rising unemployment. Our analysis is based on the 
macroeconomic data in Figure 2 and on historical accounts of the episodes in 
sources such as the United Nation’s annual Economic Survey of Latin America. 
We first consider the three cases of disinflation and then the three cases of 
capital flight. 
Chile (core period 1971-1980): This episode resulted from an extreme shift in 
macroeconomic policy. The inflation rate rose to 500% under the Socialist 
government of Salvadore Allende. Then, in 1973, the Pinochet regime 
overthrew Allende and tightened fiscal and monetary policy severely to reduce 
inflation. The inflation rate fell steadily, to a low of 10% in 1982. The 
unemployment rate shot up from 3% in 1973 to 18% in 1976, then stayed in 15 
 
double digits for the rest of the 1970s; this experience pulled up the estimated 
natural rate, U*.4  
Colombia (1994-2001) In the 1970s and 80s, Colombia’s inflation rate fluctuated 
between 15% and 30%.  In 1991, a new Constitution made price stability the 
primary goal of the central bank. Policymakers slowed the growth of monetary 
aggregates, producing high real interest rates and a 46% real appreciation over 
1991-98. Inflation fell to single digits in 2000 and unemployment experienced a 
long rise, from 8% in 1994 to 22% in 2002. (Capital flight sparked by the 1998 
Russian crisis contributed to the last part of this increase.)  
Venezuela (1996-1999) In 1996, with inflation running at 100%, Venezuela 
adopted an IMF stabilization program, the Agenda de Venezuela. As part of 
this program, the central bank adopted a crawling peg for the exchange rate 
that kept the rate of depreciation below the inflation rate. The real exchange rate 
rose by 68% over 1996-2001 and real interest rates peaked near 30% in 1998. 
Inflation fell to 13% in 2001, while unemployment rose from 7% to 18% over the 
decade from 1993 to 2003.  
We now turn to the three episodes of large unemployment increases that were 
triggered by capital flight. In each case, the exchange rate was rigid. When 
unemployment rose, it stayed high because the economy lacked the “shock 
absorber” of depreciation. 
Argentina (1987-1997) Argentina experienced capital flight in the 1990s, 
resulting first from the Mexican crisis of 1994 and then from its own rising debt 
and loss of confidence in its currency board. After the currency board fixed the 
nominal exchange rate 1991, Argentine inflation exceeded U.S. inflation for 
several years, causing a real appreciation of 60%. The combination of 
overvaluation and worsening capital flight pushed unemployment from 6% in 
1991 to 18% ten years later, on the eve of the currency board’s collapse. 
                                                            
4 Because our series for U* smooths the data on unemployment, U* can start rising before an 
event that raises unemployment. Chile is an example: the core of the U* increase begins in 1971 
while actual unemployment starts rising in 1973. 16 
 
Panama (1982-1988) The core of this episode is the period of the Latin American 
debt crisis, which caused capital flight and raised unemployment across the 
region. Panama had no exchange rate to adjust because its currency is the U.S. 
dollar. In 1989 Panama experienced another shock, the U.S. invasion that 
overthrew Noriega, which caused further capital flight and helped keep 
unemployment high. 
Paraguay (1997-1999) In Paraguay, capital flight was caused by a series of 
shocks: the crises in Mexico in 1994, Russia in 1998, and Argentina in 2000-2001. 
Paraguay did not have a hard peg, but policymakers chose to defend the 
exchange rate during much of the episode. The real exchange rate rose slightly 
from 1993 to 1998, but started to fall in 1999. Part of the increase in 
unemployment was reversed after 2002, and the increase in U* was smaller than 
those in Panama and Argentina (4.2 percentage points, compared to 8.3 points 
and 12.6 points).  
Temporary Unemployment Increases 
We have examined episodes in which unemployment rose and stayed high, 
producing a rise in our estimated natural rate U*. To get another perspective on 
these experiences, we compare them to episodes in which unemployment rose 
but then fell quickly, so U* did not rise significantly. What accounts for this 
different pattern?  
Specifically, we examine episodes in which unemployment rose by at least five 
percentage points but U* rose by less than one point. Three such episodes exist: 
one in Colombia, from 1981 to 1983, and two in Uruguay, from 1981 to 1983 and 
from 1998 to 2002. Figure 3 shows U and U* in Colombia and Uruguay, with 
shading on the periods of temporary unemployment increases. (Here we ignore 
Colombia’s persistent unemployment increase in the 1990s.) In the three 
episodes, U rises by amounts ranging from 5.9 to 8.8 percentage points, but the 
accompanying increases in U* are very small (from 0.3 to 0.9 percentage points).  17 
 
What happened during these episodes? In all three cases, the rise in 
unemployment was caused by capital flight, which was triggered by the Latin 
American debt crisis in the 1980s and by contagion from Argentina in 
Uruguay’s second episode. Thus the temporary unemployment increases had 
the same basic cause as some of the U* increases discussed above. The behavior 
of the exchange rate, however, was very different. In contrast to exchange-rate 
rigidity in Argentina, Panama, and Paraguay, the real exchange rate fell sharply 
during the temporary unemployment increases. Over 1981-86, the real 
exchange rate fell by 40% in Colombia and 50% in Uruguay; over 1998-2003 in 
Uruguay, it fell by 48%. 
These experiences bolster our interpretation of the U* increases in Argentina, 
Panama, and Paraguay. Capital flight consistently causes an increase in 
unemployment, but the persistence of this increase depends on exchange rate 
policy. In flexible regimes, a sharp depreciation pushes unemployment back 
down. When the exchange rate is rigid, unemployment remains high and U* 
rises. 
Explaining Decreases in U* 
Finally, we examine the five episodes of large U* decreases (a fall of four 
percentage points or more) shown in Table 5 and Figure 2. What explains these 
experiences? 
The five episodes have two features in common. First, each began with a high 
level of U*, ranging from 14.7% to 25.5%. These starting points were legacies of 
economic slumps that had previously raised U*. Evidently, it is possible for a 
rise in U* to be reversed eventually; on the other hand, there are no cases of 
large U* decreases starting from a moderate initial level.   
Second, in all five cases, the fall in unemployment occurred during a period 
when economic growth accelerated. In this respect, these cases are similar to the 
experiences of some European economies. Rapid growth reduced 18 
 
unemployment, for example, in the U.K. in the late 1980s and Ireland in the 
1990s (Ball, 1999).  
Beyond these broad features, the five episodes of U* decreases are 
heterogeneous. An increase in growth was spurred by a variety of factors, 
including shifts in monetary policy, changes in commodity prices, and in one 
case a rise in productivity growth. We briefly review why output growth 
increased in each case. 
Argentina (core period 2003-2007): We saw that U* rose in Argentina in the 
1990s as the country maintained its currency peg in the face of capital flight. A 
dramatic regime shift occurred when the currency board collapsed at the 
beginning of 2002. The real exchange rate fell by 70%, spurring exports, and 
output grew at an average annual rate of 9% from 2003 through 2007. The 
unemployment rate U fell from 20% to 7%, dragging down U*. 
Panama (2003-2007): After rising during the 1980s, Panama’s unemployment 
stayed high during the 1990s. But the 2000s brought an economic boom: over 
2003-2007, output growth averaged 7.9% and unemployment fell rapidly. 
Causes of the rapid growth included expansionary fiscal policy and an 
investment boom in anticipation of expansion of the Panama Canal. Strong 
aggregate demand was reflected in the inflation rate, which rose from 0.4% to 
4.2% over 2003-2007 despite Panama’s dollarization.  
Chile (1985-1992): Average output growth during the core of this episode was 
7.6%. An unusual feature of the Chilean boom is that the primary cause appears 
to be an acceleration of productivity growth, perhaps due to liberalization of 
the economy, rather than a surge in demand. The inflation rate fell over much 
of the period when unemployment was falling. Ball and Moffitt (2002) argue 
that the productivity acceleration reduced the natural rate of unemployment 
because workers’ wage aspirations did not rise as rapidly as productivity. 19 
 
Trinidad and Tobago (1988-2007): Output in Trinidad and Tobago fell by 28% 
from 1982 to 1989, a result of disinflationary monetary policy and then low oil 
prices. (Oil and gas account for 40% of the country’s GDP). The slump pushed 
unemployment to 22% in 1987, the first year for which we have data. Then oil 
prices recovered, monetary policy eased, and annual output growth averaged 
5.1% from 1990 through 2007. Strong growth pulled the unemployment rate 
down steadily. 
Jamaica (1984-1992, 2001-2007): In Jamaica, output fell 23.5% from 1972 to 1980; 
the diverse causes included political instability, drought, and an overvalued 
exchange rate. Unemployment reached 28% in 1982. Then stability improved, 
policymakers allowed the exchange rate to fall, and growth averaged 2.9% from 
1981 through 2007. The result was a U*-decrease episode that lasted 26 years 
(including two separate cores when U* fell by more than 0.5 points per year.)   
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper constructs a new data set on unemployment rates in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, and then explores the determinants of unemployment. 
Cross-country differences are explained partly by the size of the rural 
population, and there is some evidence that tax wedges also matter. Within a 
country, large increases in unemployment are caused by contractions in 
aggregate demand, resulting from either disinflationary monetary policy or a 
combination of capital flight and a rigid exchange rate. Decreases in 
unemployment occur when unemployment starts very high and economic 
growth accelerates. 
Our results about unemployment increases echo research on other parts of the 
world. Ball (1999) finds that disinflations explain increases in European 
unemployment in the 1980s and 1990s. Ball (2010) finds that capital flight and 20 
 
e x c h a n g e  r a t e  r i g i d i t y  c a u s e d  s e v e r e  s l u m p s  i n  H o n g  K o n g  a n d  t h e  B a l t i c  
countries as well as Latin America.  
Our results conflict with conventional macroeconomics, in which shifts in 
aggregate demand affect unemployment only in the short run.  We find that 
demand contractions can have long run effects:  unemployment often remains 
high for a decade or more. These findings suggest the presence of hysteresis in 
unemployment. 
Our understanding of hysteresis mechanisms is hazy.  A common story is that 
unemployed workers become detached from the labor force, turning a short-
run rise in unemployment into a long-run rise.  However, there is little direct 
evidence on the strength of this effect. Understanding hysteresis should be a 
priority for research. 
In one way, our results do not support common stories about hysteresis. Many 
discussions of Europe emphasize the role of unemployment insurance: it is 
easier to become detached from the labor force if one can live on the dole 
indefinitely.  Yet this paper finds strong hysteresis effects in Latin America, 
where unemployment insurance is much less common and generous than in 



























Costa Rica 5.46 5.57
Dominican Republic 6.71 5.69
Ecuador 2.60 3.19











Mean  6.17 5.96
Standard Deviation 3.00 3.04
Source: Author's calculations based on IDB data
Country























Constant 2.366 7.884*** 11.23*** 1.557 15.65***
(1.677) (1.581) (1.142) (3.164) (3.349)
# of obs 19 19 19 19 19
R-squared 0.239 0.096 0.598 0.107 0.642
Adj R
?
squared 0.195 0.0432 0.574 0.0543 0.597
Dependent Variable: Estimated Long Run Unemployment
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at the 10%, ** Significant at the 5%, *** 
significant at the 1%.
Rigid Emp. (DB) 0.00905
(0.0436)
Firing Costs (DB) 0.000591
(0.0192)
Labor Tax (DB) 0.112
(0.0708)
Adv. Notice (HP) -0.476
(1.773)
Indemn. Dismis (HP) -0.556
(1.046)
Soc. Sec. Contr. (HP) 0.222***
(0.0503)
Constant 5.609*** 5.922*** 3.829** 6.688*** 7.856** -0.286
(1.855) (1.540) (1.503) (1.296) (2.831) (1.532)
# of obs 19 19 19 17 17 18
R-squared 0.003 0.000 0.129 0.005 0.019 0.549
Adj R‐squared -0.0561 -0.0588 0.0778 -0.0616 -0.0469 0.521
Dependent Variable: Estimated Long Run Unemployment
























# of obs 18
R-squared 0.655
Adj R‐squared 0.609
Dependent Variable: Estimated 
Long Run Unemployment
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * 
significant at the 10%, ** Significant at the 




































Argentina 1979 2000 21 12.6 3.2 15.8 . 1987 1997 11 10.0
Chile 1965 1983 18 10.2 5.7 15.8 . 1971 1980 10 8.2
Panama 1963 1992 29 8.3 6.5 14.7 Start 1982 1988 7 4.4
Colombia 1990 2003 13 7.8 10.1 17.8 . 1994 2001 8 6.9
Paraguay 1989 2003 14 4.2 5.6 9.8 . 1997 1999 3 1.6
Venezuela 1989 2002 13 4.2 9.5 13.7 . 1996 1999 4 2.1
Panama 1992 2007 15 -5.8 14.7 9.0 End 2003 2007 5 -3.6
Argentina 2000 2007 7 -5.8 15.8 9.9 End 2003 2007 5 -5.1
Chile 1983 1994 11 -7.6 15.8 8.2 . 1985 1992 8 -6.8
1984 1992 9 -7.8
2001 2007 7 -4.7
Trinidad and Tobago 1987 2007 20 -17.1 22.7 5.6 Start/End 1988 2007 20 -17.1
End
Country
Episode (U* total absolute change > 4 points) Core (U* change > 0.5 points per year)
Jamaica 1981 2007 26 -15.9 25.5 9.525 
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Figure 2 (continued) 
 
 
















































































































Figure 2 (continued) 
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Figure 2 (continued) 
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Data Appendix 
A. Cross-country comparable unemployment rates from the IADB 
The unemployment data from the Interamerican Development Bank are based 
on household surveys in each country in its sample. The IADB seeks to produce 
harmonized statistics that are as comparable as possible across countries and 
over time. The data are described in IADB (2004). 
Unemployment Definition: The IADB measures unemployment as the number 
of unemployed divided by the labor force (employed plus unemployed). For 
most countries, an individual’s status is determined by his situation during a 
“reference week.” He is counted as unemployed if he was not employed and 
did not search actively for work during the reference week. Active search 
includes activities such as contacting potential employers or employment 
agencies, interviewing for jobs, or filling out applications. The labor force is 
restricted to ages 15 through 64.  
In Colombia and Mexico, the reference period is one month rather than one 
week; in Chile, it is two months. A longer reference period increases the 
unemployment rate. Brazil’s monthly employment survey reports 
unemployment rates based on one-week and one-month reference periods in 
June and July, 2002; the unemployment rate based on one week is 0.92 times the 
rate based on one month. Based on this example, we multiply all 
unemployment rates in Colombia, Mexico, and Chile by 0.92 to make them 
comparable with other countries. IADB staff have told us that this adjustment is 
reasonable. 





IADB Unemployment rates 
 
 







1990 7.3 3.7 7.6 4.6
1991 5.6 6.9 5.5
1992 6.4 5.5 7.1 5.1 6.8 4.0
1993 9.1 5.6 6.6 6.6 4.0
1994 11.9 6.2 6.7 4.1 2.3
1995 16.1 3.5 6.5 7.3 5.1 1.6 5.3
1996 17.2 2.1 7.4 5.3 8.9 6.2 5.2
1997 13.4 1.4 8.3 9.2 5.7 5.0
1998 12.2 9.6 9.2 11.4 5.6 3.3 5.9 1.8
1999 13.6 4.0 10.4 15.1 6.0 5.2
2000 13.9 4.3 9.7 15.6 5.2 4.9 4.7 1.5
2001 18.0 4.9 10.1 14.3 6.2 5.7 5.2
2002 17.6 4.0 9.9 14.6 4.3 4.3 2.2
2003 15.5 4.5 10.7 9.1 13.7 6.8 5.1
2004 12.6 9.8 12.2 6.5 3.8
2005 10.7 6.0 10.3 10.9 6.7 4.3
2006 9.6 5.7 9.2 7.0 12.1 6.0 2.5 3.1 1.6
2007 9.1 6.0 8.8 10.3 4.7 13.6 3.3 3.2
Honduras Jamaica Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela
1990 4.4
1991 6.9
1992 2.7 3.7 8.1 5.5
1993 12.1 4.9
1994 3.7 6.4
1995 2.6 7.5 2.7 9.9 6.7
1996 3.7 4.1 11.1 8.1
1997 2.9 7.0 4.7 10.8 6.8
1998 2.7 2.4 3.0 7.5 4.6 3.9 9.6 7.4
1999 2.7 5.7 5.6 4.5 10.5 10.3
2000 2.5 6.0 4.0 12.9 9.6
2001 2.1 3.7 6.7 6.4 4.6 13.9 9.0
2002 1.8 7.5 2.8 6.8 9.9 5.2 15.7 11.1
2003 3.5 7.1 7.1 4.6 15.3 11.3
2004 3.6 6.1 6.8 11.3 11.1
2005 2.2 3.5 6.3 5.4 10.6
2006 1.6 3.1 5.4 7.6 3.8 4.2
2007 3.1 3.6 5.0 3.9 3.535 
 
B.   New Data Set of Unemployment Rates 
 
To derive our data, we have gone country by country to figure out how 
unemployment was measured in different periods.  We have made judgments 
about which changes in methodology are small enough to ignore, and how to 
adjust for larger changes.  In some cases we can splice different unemployment 
series together using periods in which they overlap.  When in doubt, we have 
sought advice from people at the agencies that produce unemployment data. 
We have pieced together data from country-specific sources –central banks, 
labor ministries and national statistical agencies– and international agencies 
such as the International Labor Organization. Where a methodological change 
appears significant but we cannot reliably estimate its effects, we discard the 
shortest portion of the data that yields a consistent series 
Here we report the sources of data, the definition of unemployment, and our 
adjustments to the series for each country. Table A2 reports the data.  
Argentina. Sources:  ILO (International Labor Organization) and INDEC 
(National Institute of Statistics and Census). Surveys cover Gran Buenos Aires 
and include people ages 10+. Definition: No job and searched actively during 
the reference week. Prior to 2003, unemployment rates are averages based on 
surveys in May and October. In 2003, several methodological changes were 
introduced: the frequency of surveys was increased to one per quarter; some 
types of female labor that had previously been ignored were included in 
employment; and the definition of job search of the unemployed was 
broadened. At one point in time, the INDEC reports results for both versions of 
the surveys: it reports the new series for the second quarter of 2003 and the old 
series for May 2003. The ratio of the unemployment rates in the new and old 
data is 1.14. Therefore, to correct for the break in the series in 03, for 03-07, we 
average outcomes for the second and fourth quarter and divide the figure by 
1.14.  
Bolivia. Sources: ILO and INE (National Institute of Statistics). The age covered 
by the surveys is 10+, while the geographical coverage is “main towns” prior to 36 
 
1996 and urban areas thereafter. After analyzing the data, we decided that the 
change in geographical coverage was small enough to ignore. Definition: No job 
and searched actively during the reference week. The unemployment rate for 
1998 is missing; in Table A2, we impute this number by averaging the 
unemployment rates in 1997 and 1999.  
Brazil. Source: IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics), PME 
(Monthly Employment Survey). The surveys cover people 15+. Geographical 
coverage: Metropolitan regions of Recife, Salvador, Belo Horizonte, Rio de 
Janeiro, São Paulo and Porto Alegre. The figures we report are averages of 
monthly rates. Definition before 2003:  No job and searched actively during the 
reference week. In 2003, a number of methodological changes were introduced, 
including new definitions of the geographical areas covered by the survey and 
an extension of the reference period for search to 30 days. The IBGE performed 
both versions of the survey from March through December 2002; the average 
ratio of unemployment rates is 1.47. Therefore, we divide the unemployment 
rates for 2003 and later by 1.47 to make them comparable to the older data. 
Chile. Source: Encuesta de ocupación y desocupación, Universidad de Chile. 
The survey covers Gran Santiago and is performed in June of each year. Ages 
14+. Definition: No job and searched actively during the reference week. There 
are no breaks in the original series. 
Colombia. Sources: ILO and DANE (Administrative National Department of 
Statistics). We use the survey from September of each year. Ages 12+. 
Geographical coverage includes seven cities: Bogota, Medellin, Cali, 
Barranquilla, Bucaramanga, Pasto and Manizales. The weights on the cities 
changed in 1991; we ignore this change. Definition before 2001: No job and 
searched actively during the last year (thus, includes “hidden unemployment” 
or “discouraged workers” who would not be counted as unemployed in many 
countries). In 2001, there were several methodological changes including a 
redefinition of unemployment to require search during a reference week. Both 
versions of the unemployment rate were reported in 2000; the ratio of the old 37 
 
and new rates is 1.19. Therefore, we multiply unemployment rates in 2001 and 
later by 1.19. In 2006, new methodological changes were made; nevertheless, 
CEI (an independent commission of experts, 2008) concluded that the impact of 
the changes on the urban unemployment rate is statistically insignificant. Thus, 
we ignore the break. 
Costa Rica. Sources: ILO and INEC (National Institute of Statistics and Census). 
National survey in July of each year. Ages 12+. Definition before 1987: No job 
and looked for one during the reference week or did not look for a job during 
the reference week for “circumstantial reasons” but looked for one “in the 
past”. Starting in 1987, “In the past” is restricted to 5 weeks. This 
methodological change is similar to the narrowing of the unemployment 
definition in Colombia and Panama. Based on these countries, we estimate that 
the old definition raises unemployment rates by a factor of 1.1. Therefore, we 
divide the pre-87 data by 1.1.  
Dominican Republic. Source: Labor Force National Survey, Central Bank of the 
Dominican Republic. National rates, ages 10+. Definition: Includes hidden 
unemployment, that is, no job search required to be counted as unemployed.  
Ecuador. Source: ILO. Survey in November (except July in 1993 and 2001, 
December in 2007). Ages: 12+ until 1990, 10+ thereafter; we ignore this change. 
Geographic coverage is urban areas of Quito, Guayaquil and Cuenca. 
Definition: No job and active search during a reference period of five weeks. 
El Salvador. Source: ILO. In the original data, unemployment rates are national 
except for 1988-1992, when they are urban. IADB data suggest that urban rates 
are 1.1 times national rates. Therefore, we divide the unemployment rates for 
1988-92 by 1.1. Ages 10+. Definition: no job and have actively searched for a job 
(reference period is not explicit).  
Guatemala. Source: ILO. National rates, ages 10+. Definition: No job during 
reference week and searched actively during the 4 preceding weeks.  38 
 
Honduras. Source: INE (National Institute of Statistics). Survey of urban areas 
in September (except March in 1993 and 2001). Ages 10+. Definition: No job in 
the reference week and searched actively during the reference week. 
Unemployment rate for 2000 is missing; in Table A2 we impute this number by 
averaging the unemployment rates in 1999 and 2001. 
Jamaica. Sources: ILO. National rates. Definition: “The unemployed comprise 
all those aged 14 years and over who were looking for work, wanting work and 
available for work. Persons looking for work must have made a positive 
attempt to seek a job such as: registration at employment agency; visiting job 
sites in search of a job; applying in person to prospective employers; putting 
advertisements in any public press or place; writing letters of application; 
asking someone to try to find a job; making investigations with a view of 
starting own farm or business.”  
Mexico.  Sources: ECSO (Continuous Survey on Occupation), 1973-1984, and 
ENEU (National Employment Urban Survey), 1985-2004. The ECSO data cover 
three cities: Mexico City, Guadalajara and Monterrey. ENEU provides 
unemployment rates for individual cities; we construct a weighted average for 
the three cities using population estimates from the 1990 census. Ages 12+. 
Definition: No job and searched actively during the reference week. Before 
1985, the unemployed include persons waiting to start a job in 30 days; persons 
who expect to return to a previous job within 30 days; and unpaid family 
workers working less than 15 hours per week. Starting in 1985, the first two 
groups are counted as employed and the third is out of the labor force. Both 
versions of the unemployment rate are reported for 1984; the ratio of the old 
definition to the new one is 1.05. Therefore, we divide the data before 1985 by 
1.05.  
Panama. Sources: UN Yearbook of Labour Statistics (1963-69), ILO (1970-99), 
Contraloría de Panamá (2000-). National rates, ages 15+. Definition: includes 
hidden unemployment. The unemployment rate is missing for 1980-81 and 
1990. In Table A2, we use the 1979 rate for 1980-1981. (We did not use the 1982 39 
 
rate because of the likely effect of the Latin American debt crisis.) We impute a 
rate for 1990 by averaging the rates for 1989 and 1991.  
Paraguay.  Sources: ILO (1979-96), LAC Statistical Yearbook (1997-). 
Geographical coverage is Asunción Metro area until 1994 and urban areas 
thereafter. Ages 12+ for 1979-1992 and 1994; otherwise, 10+. We ignore these 
changes. Definition: No job in reference week and searched actively during 
reference week. The unemployment rate for 1981 is missing; we use the average 
of 1980 and 1982. 
Peru. Sources: MTPS (Ministry of Labor and Social Promotion), 1970-94; INEI 
(National Institute of Statistics), 1995-. Unemployment rates for Lima, ages 14+. 
Definition: No job in reference week and searched actively during reference 
week. Missing data for 1978, 1985, and 1988 are imputed by averaging adjacent 
years.  
Trinidad and Tobago. Sources: Yearbook of Labour Statistics and ILO. National 
survey, ages 15+. Definition   : includes hidden unemployment. (We have 
discarded data before 1987, which do not count first-time job seekers as 
unemployed, because we do not know how large an adjustment to make to 
these data.)  
Uruguay. Sources: Yearbook of Labour Statistics and INE (National Institute of 
Statistics). Unemployment rates for Montevideo, ages 14+. Definition: No job 
during reference week and searched actively during reference week. Starting in 
1981, domestic workers are not counted as employed; this change appears small 
enough to ignore. The unemployment rate in 1975 is missing; we impute it by 
averaging 1974 and 1976. 
Venezuela. Sources: ILO and INE (National Institute of Statistics). National 
rates, ages 15+. We calculate annual unemployment rates as averages of rates 




New dataset of Unemployment rates 
 
  






















1967 5.9 6.2 7.9
1968 6.5 7.0 8.4 6.8
1969 7.3 6.6 8.7 7.4
1970 4.8 7.2 7.1 7.0 7.5 7.2
1971 6.0 5.2 7.6 9.5 7.6 6.2
1972 6.6 3.6 23.2 6.8 7.6 7.7 5.3
1973 5.6 3.0 21.9 7.1 7.0 5.0 8.9 5.0
1974 3.4 10.6 20.5 6.8 5.8 6.5 8.1 6.2
1975 2.3 16.1 10.5 20.4 6.8 6.4 7.4 10.5 7.8
1976 4.5 18.0 10.4 5.7 22.4 6.4 6.7 6.7 6.5 12.8 6.0
1977 2.8 13.0 9.4 4.2 24.2 7.7 8.7 5.4 8.5 11.8 4.8
1978 2.8 12.8 8.2 4.1 24.3 6.5 8.1 4.1 7.5 10.2 4.6
1979 2.0 12.5 8.9 4.4 27.5 5.5 8.8 5.9 6.5 8.4 5.4
1980 2.3 11.7 9.1 5.4 27.3 4.3 8.8 4.1 7.1 7.3 6.0
1981 4.5 9.0 8.1 7.9 26.0 4.0 8.8 4.9 6.8 6.6 6.3
1982 4.8 6.9 23.2 9.1 8.5 27.6 4.0 8.4 5.6 6.6 11.7 7.1
1983 4.2 7.6 22.7 11.1 8.2 26.4 6.5 9.7 8.3 9.0 15.4 10.1
1984 3.8 8.1 18.4 13.1 4.5 25.6 5.7 10.1 7.3 8.9 13.9 13.0
1985 5.3 5.9 16.2 14.0 6.2 25.0 4.8 12.3 5.1 7.1 13.0 13.1
1986 4.4 4.0 15.4 13.0 5.6 23.7 4.8 10.5 6.1 5.3 11.4 11.0
1987 5.3 4.1 13.5 11.1 5.6 21.0 4.3 11.8 5.5 4.8 22.3 9.3 9.2
1988 6.0 4.2 11.2 10.1 5.5 8.5 18.9 4.1 16.3 4.7 6.4 22.0 9.1 7.3
1989 7.3 10.0 3.6 9.3 8.9 3.8 7.6 16.8 3.4 16.3 6.1 7.9 22.0 8.5 9.9
1990 7.3 7.3 4.7 9.7 10.2 4.6 6.1 9.1 6.9 15.7 3.0 16.3 6.6 8.3 20.0 9.3 10.4
1991 5.8 5.9 5.2 8.3 9.8 5.5 19.6 5.8 6.8 7.1 15.7 3.0 16.2 5.1 5.9 18.5 8.9 9.5
1992 6.7 5.5 6.1 6.0 9.2 4.1 20.3 8.9 7.2 5.1 15.4 3.3 14.7 5.3 9.4 19.6 9.0 7.7
1993 10.1 6.0 5.7 6.4 7.8 4.1 19.9 8.3 9.9 7.1 16.3 3.9 13.3 5.1 9.9 19.8 8.4 6.7
1994 12.1 3.1 5.4 6.3 7.6 4.2 16.0 7.1 7.7 4.0 15.4 4.0 14.0 4.4 8.8 18.4 9.2 8.7
1995 18.8 3.6 5.0 6.1 8.7 5.2 15.8 6.9 7.7 6.0 16.2 7.2 14.0 5.3 7.1 17.2 10.8 10.3
1996 18.4 3.8 5.8 7.2 12.0 6.2 16.7 10.4 7.7 6.6 16.0 6.5 14.3 8.2 7.2 16.2 12.3 11.8
1997 15.7 3.7 6.1 6.7 12.1 5.7 16.0 9.2 8.0 5.2 16.5 4.2 13.4 7.1 8.6 15.0 11.6 11.4
1998 13.7 5.5 8.3 6.9 15.0 5.6 14.4 11.5 7.3 4.6 15.5 3.7 13.6 6.6 6.9 14.2 10.2 11.2
1999 15.0 7.2 8.3 15.4 20.1 6.0 13.8 14.4 7.0 1.9 5.1 15.7 2.9 11.8 9.4 9.4 13.1 11.8 14.9
2000 15.4 7.4 7.8 14.4 20.5 5.2 13.9 9.0 7.0 1.4 5.7 15.5 2.5 13.5 10.0 7.8 12.2 13.9 13.9
2001 18.1 8.5 6.8 15.0 21.4 6.1 15.6 11.0 7.0 1.3 6.3 15.0 2.9 14.7 10.8 8.8 10.8 15.5 13.3
2002 20.4 8.7 7.9 13.6 21.5 6.4 16.1 9.3 6.2 3.1 5.9 14.3 3.0 14.1 14.7 9.7 10.4 17.0 15.9
2003 15.0 7.4 8.4 13.4 20.2 6.7 17.0 11.5 6.9 3.4 7.4 10.9 3.5 13.6 11.2 10.3 10.5 16.7 18.0
2004 12.7 6.2 7.8 11.6 17.6 6.5 18.4 8.6 6.8 3.1 8.0 11.4 4.4 12.4 10.0 10.5 8.3 12.9 15.2
2005 10.7 8.1 6.7 11.5 15.9 6.6 17.9 7.9 7.2 2.5 6.1 10.9 5.4 10.3 7.6 11.4 8.0 11.8 14.0
2006 9.3 8.0 6.8 11.1 14.6 6.0 16.2 7.8 6.6 1.8 5.2 9.6 5.1 9.1 8.9 8.8 6.2 8.5 10.0
2007 7.3 6.3 8.5 12.9 4.6 15.6 6.1 6.4 9.3 5.6 6.8 7.2 7.2 5.5 6.9 8.441 
 
C.  Other Variables 
This appendix describes the data used in the cross-country regressions. 
 
Development related variables: 
•  Per capita GDP, [PPP constant 2000 international US$]: average  per capita 
GDP from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) between 
1990 and 2007.  
•  Education: This is a measure proposed by Barro and Lee (2000) as a proxy 
for economic development. It is based on the educational attainment of the 
population ages 25+, measured as no schooling, primary, secondary, and 
higher.   We took the average value for years 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005.  
•  Value added of the agricultural sector as a percentage of GDP: we take the 
simple average between 1990 and 2007. Data come from the WDI. 
•  Rural population as a percentage of total population: we take the simple 
average between 1990 and 2007. Data come from the WDI. 
Labor Market Rigidities: (Based on descriptions provided by Heckman and 
Pages (HP) and Doing Business (DB).) 
For the HP data, available years vary widely across countries. In each country, 
the three HP variables are available for the same years. The only exception is 
Guatemala, where only data on social security contributions (SSC) are available. 
We exclude Guatemala from regressions that include other labor-market 
variables. The following table shows available years for each country. For the 




Argentina 1996, 1997, 1998
Bolivia 1990, 1993, 1995-1997, 1999
Brazil 1992,1993, 1995-1999
Chile 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998
Colombia 1990, 1991, 1993, 1995-1999
Costa Rica 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, 1998
Dominican Republic 1996, 1998
Ecuador 1995, 1998
El Salvador 1995, 1997, 1998
Honduras 1992, 1996-1999
Mexico 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998
Nicaragua 1993, 1998
Panama 1991, 1995, 1997-1999
Paraguay 1995, 1999
Peru 1991, 1994, 1996-1998
Uruguay 1995, 1997, 1998
Venezuela 1993, 1995, 1997-1999  
Definitions: 
•  Advance Notice (HP): indicates the number of months with which an 
employee has to be notified if he is to be fired.  
•  Indemnities for Dismissal (HP):  Cost of mandatory indemnities for 
dismissal, reported in multiples of monthly wages.  
•  Social Security Contributions (HP): expected discounted cost of complying 
with social security laws, in multiples of monthly wages. This cost includes 
“contributions by employers and employees to old age, disability and death; 
sickness and maternity; work injury; unemployment insurance and Family 
allowances programs”.  
For a few years the World Bank generated and reported data on labor market 
regulations as part of the Doing Business (DB) program. Unfortunately, that 
part of the dataset was later discontinued. We use some of labor market data 
once produced by DB. For two of the DB variables used in the paper—Rigidity 
of Employment and Firing Costs—we have figures for 2003-2006 (except for 
Trinidad and Tobago, where the information started in 2005). The labor tax 
variable is only available for 2006. For the regressions, we average the available 
numbers for each country. 43 
 
Definitions: 
•  Rigidity of Employment Index (DB): This variable is the average of three 
other indexes:  a difficulty of hiring index, a rigidity of hours index and a 
difficulty of redundancy index. They all take values between 0 and 100, with 
higher values indicating more rigidity. The difficulty of hiring index 
measures “(i) whether fixed-term contracts are prohibited for permanent 
tasks; (ii) the maximum cumulative duration of fixed term contracts; and (iii) 
the ratio of the minimum wage for a trainee or first-time employee to the 
average value added per worker”. The rigidity of hours index “has 5 
components: (i) whether there are restrictions on night work; (ii) whether 
there are restrictions on weekly holiday work;(iii) whether the workweek 
can consist of 5.5 days; (iv) whether the workweek can extend to 50 hours or 
more (including overtime) for 2 months a year to respond to a seasonal 
increase in production; and (v) whether paid annual vacation is 21 working 
days or fewer”. The difficulty of redundancy index has 8 components: “(i) 
whether redundancy is disallowed as a basis for terminating workers; (ii) 
whether the employer needs to notify a third party (such as a government 
agency) to terminate 1 redundant worker; (iii) whether the employer needs 
to notify a third party to terminate a group of 9 redundant workers; (iv) 
whether the employer needs approval from a third party to terminate 1 
redundant worker; (v) whether the employer needs approval from a third 
party to terminate a group of 9 redundant workers; (vi) whether the law 
requires the employer to reassign or retrain a worker before making the 
worker redundant; (vii) whether priority rules apply for redundancies; and 
(viii) whether priority rules apply for reemployment”. 
•  Firing Costs (DB): This variable measures the cost of advance notice 
requirements, severance payments and penalties due when terminating a 
redundant worker, expressed in weekly wages.  
•  Labor Tax (DB):  This variable is the sum of all labor-related taxes payable 
by a medium size business, including payroll taxes, mandatory social 44 
 
security contributions, mandatory health insurance, mandatory 
unemployment insurance, and any local contributions that depend on the 
payroll or number of employees. Only taxes with statutory incidence on the 
employer are included. (For more detail on this variable, see Djankov et al., 
2009).  